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ARGUMENT 
I. Hallows' argument that Peters' averment in the Complaint that "Hallows . . 
. claims to have shot Trooper and Kiva under color of law. . • etc." 
automatically triggers the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's one year notice 
and statute of limitations is wrong because the statute makes those 
requirements depend on what occurred in fact, not on what Hallows claims 
occurred. 
Paul Peters alleged in the complaint: 
"Ted Hallows claims to have shot Trooper and Kiva under color of law as required 
by 'State Code' acting in his capacity as a fish hatchery employee for the State of 
Utah. Ted Hallows claims his act was required by and consistent with the 'State's 
Mission Statement' on conservation." 
Hallows argues that Peters' allegation amounts to an admission that the one 
year notice and short statute of limitations of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act applies. But, the statute does not make the application of those requirements 
depend on what Hallow's claimed then or what he claims now. The statute makes 
it depend on whether in fact his shooting the dogs was "during the performance of 
the employee's duties, in the course of employment, or under color of authority." 
[U.C.A. sec. 63-30-4 (3) and (4)] The difference is critical. 
Suppose a city police officer beats up his wife in a jealous rage. During the 
course of the beating, the police officer says "I'm beating you in the performance 
of my duties, in the course of my employment, and under color of my authority." 
1 
Does the police officer's claim mean that his battered spouse must make a claim 
against the city within one year and, on the city's denial of liability, bring the 
action within one year? Of course not. The statutory language controls, and that 
statutory language makes the outcome depend on the fact, not the claim. If, in 
fact, the police officer was acting in the performance of his duties, in the course of 
employment, or under color of authority, the one year notice and short statute of 
limitations would apply. If, in fact, the police officer was not, those provisions do 
not apply. 
Hallows made two motions for summary judgment. The record shows that 
in both motions the issue was whether there was a genuine issue whether in fact 
Hallows was acting in the course of employment. This was the issue addressed by 
counsel, and the issue the two judges decided. First Judge Nehring decided that 
"the factual question of whether [Hallows] shot the dogs within the scope of his 
employment as a DNR employee . . . .cannot be resolved from the pleadings 
alone." [R 0090, "Order on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss"] Then, Judge Brian 
decided that "Hallows was acting within the scope of his employment when he 
shot the dogs on April 24, 1996." [R0350, "Findings of Fact"] 
II. The rule of Nielson v. Gurley does not apply to this case because in that 
case it was undisputed that Officer Gurley acted "while performing his duties 
as a State employee and . . . under color of that authority," but in this case 
2 
the question of whether Hallows was acting "in the course of employment" is a 
genuine issue of fact. 
In Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) one issue was 
whether the one-year notice requirement of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
applies where (1) the officer acted within the scope of employment, but (2) there is 
a genuine issue as to whether he acted with malice. 
Officer Gurley was a wildlife protection officer working for the Division of 
Wildlife Resources. On the first weekend of the chukar season he came upon a 
bird pen. He could see chukars inside the pen, and there was a device to trap birds 
that entered the pen. There was no sign posted saying that it was a legal pen. He 
forcibly entered the pen, permitted the chukars to escape, dismantled the trap, and 
confiscated the bird feed, feeders, identification bands, and watering devices. 
Officer Gurley did not know it at the time, but Mr. Nielson had a permit for the 
bird pen issued by the Division of Wildlife Resources. 
Mr. Nielson claimed that Officer Gurley had acted with malice.1 He 
claimed that Officer Gurley had watched him walk from the bird pen to his vehicle 
without saying a thing, and had waited until he drove away before wrecking the 
3 
1
 The reasons why Mr. Nielson thought Officer Gurley had acted with malice are not set 
forth in the opinion. I reviewed parts of the record and interviewed Mr. Nielson to find out the 
basis of his claims. BKD. 
pen. Mr. Nielson also claimed Officer Gurley had acted with malice in wrecking 
the pen instead of simply opening the door and disabling the trapping device. 
The critical fact is that Officer Gurley, whether he acted with malice or not, 
acted in the course of employment. The Utah Court of Appeals said: 
"[I]n the instant case, it is clear that the conduct [of Officer Gurely] 
of which Nielson complains was conduct that Gurley engaged in 
while performing his duties as a State employee and was done under 
the color of that authority. 888 P.2d at 134. 
But, in this case there is a genuine issue of fact whether Hallows was acting 
in the course of employment. 
III. Hallows9 argument that Plaintiffs "failed to marshal the evidence 
supporting the court's findings of fact" is frivolous because the marshaling 
requirement only applies if an appeal is taken from a trial on the grounds that 
a specific finding of fact is "against the clear weight of the evidence," and not 
to an appeal from the granting of a motion for summary judgment. 
After a bench trial at which both sides present evidence and the judge 
makes "findings of fact," the losing side may take an appeal on the grounds that an 
essential finding of fact "is against the clear weight of the evidence." If the losing 
side takes an appeal on this grounds, it must marshal all the evidence in the record 
in support of the finding of fact and demonstrate that this evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when it is viewed in the light most 
favorable to the winning side. 
4 
It is frivolous for Appellee to attempt to apply this rule to an appeal from a 
grant of summary judgment. The issue on an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment is whether there is a genuine issue, and the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom are view in the light most favorable to the losing 
side. Higgens v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah 1993) (previously 
cited in Apellants' Brief, page 1). 
It follows that the marshaling requirement actually cuts the other way. 
Appellee should have marshaled the evidence in the record contrary to Judge 
Brian's ruling that there was no genuine issue of fact. Appellee failed to do this. 
Shari Crisman's statement in her deposition that Trooper was too crippled to chase 
deer strongly supports Paul Peter's affidavit that Hallows told him that he had shot 
the dogs because they disturbed his garden and bothered his horses. A crippled 
dog could disturb a garden, possibly by defecating in it. A crippled dog could 
bother horses by standing outside the paddock in which the horses were confined. 
But, a crippled dog cannot chase deer. 
It is also frivolous for Appellee to argue that under the rule of Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 252 (1986), Paul Peter's affidavit may be 
dismissed as "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Appellants agree that 
this court may look to parallel federal authority in interpreting Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, and that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
5 
should not be taken lightly, but Appellants believe the decision actually supports 
their position! 
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby the issue was "whether the clear-and-
convincing-evidence requirement must be considered by a court ruling on a motion 
for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a 
case to which New York Times [v. Sullivan] applies." [477 U.S. at 244.] The same 
issue is later restated in slightly different language. [477 U.S. at 247.] The holding 
of the case reflects the same issue. [477 U.S. at 257.] 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby was an action for libel where the plaintiffs were 
public figures, the classic pattern of New York Times v. Sullivan, The trial court 
had held that the defendant's reporter's affidavit documenting his thorough 
investigation and research and his reliance on numerous sources precluded a 
finding of actual malice in the light of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard 
of proof that the plaintiff public figure must meet. 477 U.S. at 246. The Court of 
Appeals reversed on the grounds that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard 
was irrelevant. 477 U.S. at 247. 
Thus, had counsel studied the decision, counsel would have realized that 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby is a burden of proof case. The effect of the decision is 
to let the trial judge step outside a judge's normal role in a motion for summary 
judgment (where the question of the weight of the evidence is left to the 
6 
jury), and actually weigh the evidence in order to make the "clear-and-convincing" 
standard for the burden of proof meaningful. Just as in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, the Supreme Court changed the law of libel to protect Freedom of 
Speech, so in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, the Supreme Court changed the law of 
summary judgment in libel cases to protect Freedom of Speech. 
What has Anderson v. Liberty Lobby to do with a case that does not involve 
the "clear-and-convincing" standard? Nothing. This is what Justice White wrote 
for the majority in that case: 
"If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary 
judgment or for a directed verdict based on a lack of proof of a material 
fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence 
unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury 
could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." 477 U.S. 
at 252. 
If the jury in this case believes Hallows and his oath helpers are a pack of liars, 
and believes Paul Peters and Shari Crisman are telling the truth, it could return a 
verdict for plaintiffs on the evidence that was brought before Judge Brian by 
affidavit and deposition. The decision in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby actually 
supports Paul Peters and Shari Crisman, not Hallows. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the dismissal 
of their action and remand the case to the Third District Court for trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
Appellee endorsed on the cover sheet of his brief "Appellee does not 
request oral argument or published opinion." Appellants' position is: 
(A) If the Court of Appeals decides for Appellants on the basis of the 
authority they have cited, there is no reason for oral argument or published opinion 
because the established rules of law will not be changed. The reversal would be a 
matter of "correction of error," an error committed by Judge Brian. 
(B) But, if the Court of Appeals decides for Appellee, it will be changing 
the law radically. No change from trial by jury to trial by compurgation (the 
technical term for a trial by obtaining oath helpers) should be made unadvisedly or 
without published opinion. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 1999: ^ ~ 
/s/ B)9yd Kimball Dyer \J Isl Paul Howard Peters 
Attorney for Plantiffs Sari Lynn Crisman Appearing pro se 
and Mark Crisman 
-3% c __ 
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